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lt is almost five years since Robert Bates published
Markets and States in Tropical Africa: the Political
Basis of Agricultural Policies,' in which he sought to
explain the existence of widespread discrimination
against peasant producers in Africa. As Africa's crisis
has deepened, his analysis has attracted widespread
attention both among academics and policy-makers,
not least because it appears to provide a refreshingly
clear and simple view ofa complex and hitherto much
neglected problem. The fact that it happens to reach
conclusions that support arguments now fashionable
in World Bank/IMF circles2 has naturally reinforced
its popularity and significance.
This brief paper will examine the analysis presented in
that book, since it remains the most accessible and
comprehensive statement of Bates' position. It will
argue that, although Bates has drawn welcome
attention to political issues that have been ignored too
often by economists and others, the clarity and
simplicity of his conclusions largely reflect the fact
that many of the most intractable sources of
complexity have been excluded from consideration in
various ways. Once reintroduced, these issues
undermine those conclusions and destroy the
deceptive simplicity of the argument, forcing the
discussion back onto the familiar terrain of political
economy, with all its ambiguities and uncertainties.
Indeed, judged within that context, it is not clear that
the analysis has advanced our understanding of the
politics of Africa's policies.
Even so, there can be no doubting the importance of
the issues that Bates has chosen to address, nor of the
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interest and value of much of his empirically based
discussion. In that sense his work is both topical and a
welcome reminder that development is not a technical
problem, but primarily a social and political one.
Equally, the shortcomings of this particular attempt to
analyse aspects of the political process, might serve as
a warning to others who will follow in his footsteps.
It may appear unhelpful to suggest that the highly
tentative and uncertain propositions of the political
economy debate should be preferred to the crisp and
clear conclusions offered by Bates, but that is exactly
the suggestion made in this article. On past experience
it may be important to stress that this article does not
counterpose some alternative solution to that offered
by Bates, but is concerned to evaluate the internal
coherence and the underlying assumptions of his
argument. Hence it does not argue that the political
question is either unimportant or simple; on the
contrary it suggests that it is vitally important and not
nearly as simple as Bates suggests. Nor does it
juxtapose the 'efficient' state to an 'inefficient' market;
rather it challenges the proposition that, in the African
context, a desirable politics is simply that which
supports and facilitates responsiveness to market
signals. Finally, it may be necessary to point out that
the arguments put forward here cannot be countered
by the charge that they do not offer a better
explanation, although this is a depressingly common
non sequitur. The article does not attempt to provide
such an alternative, but merely considers the
weaknesses in Bates' approach and suggests that if we
are to improve our understanding of these issues, it
will be necessary to confront them in their true and
formidable complexity.
This note will consider, in turn: the problem being
analysed; the approach to that problem; the factors
that are effectively excluded from consideration; and,
finally, the implications of these deficiencies for Bates'
conclusions and for the more general debate.
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The Problem Addressed by Bates
Bates begins by noting Africa's agricultural failure, as
reflected in the long term stagnation of per capita food
production and of agricultural exports and suggests
that 'a consensus had emerged that the most
important [impediment to agricultural growth] is the
nature of the incentives offered to producers', and
then suggests that 'it follows that the origins of the
problem lie in the actions of those who distort the
operations of the market' (pp 1/2). He then notes, with
apparent surprise, that 'agricultural economists who
stress the ineptness of government policy-makers
often praise the acumen of persons in market
operations' and promises to 'identify the source of this
puzzling imbalance in human capabilities'. In this
context he sets out to answer a far more ambitious
question, namely: 'Why should reasonable men adopt
public policies that have harmful consequences for the
societies they govern?'
To this surprisingly and, one suspects, intentionally
naive question he eventually gives the not very
surprising answer that policy-makers behave in this
way when it is in their narrow self-interest to do so.
Once established, this proposition is then used to
explain all manner of specific policies by identifying
the groups whose narrow self-interest they are thought
to serve.
This procedure is basic to most political economy
discussions, and is reminiscent of those Marxist
analyses that identify - or invent - endless numbers
of 'petit bourgeoisies' to explain any and every twist
and turn in public policy. However, for Bates, as for
others, the value of such discussions depends on the
definition of the underlying concepts. What is the
public interest? What policies serve the public interest?
What serves any group's or individual's self-interest?
How does a group or individual distinguish between
short and long-run interests? When does actual self-
interest diverge from perceived self-interest?
It is in seeking to answer these questions that any
analyst, activist or politician confronts the greatest
difficulties. Yet Bates makes short work of these
problems, by retreating into a world where life is all
too simple. The public interest is served by efficiency;
efficiency is served by following the market; a group's
self-interest lies in maximising its present income and
power; short and long term interests do not diverge;
and a group's perceived self-interest coincides with its
actual self-interest. In this transparent, make-believe
land, Bates pursues his quarry and inevitably reaches
clear and simple conclusions. At least, he does so until
the very end of the book, when he casually raises the
possibility that a group may not act in its immediate
narrow self-interest but, by then, it is too late to
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integrate this possibility usefully into the discussion,
or to recognise that it undermines his entire argument.
Bates' 'Approach' to the Problem
In addressing the problem of agricultural policy, Bates
begins by making it 'manageable', by reducing it to
one of 'inadequate prices for agriculture' (where
'inadequate' is defined as diverging from world
market prices). Henceforth the discussion can confine
itself to the reasons why African governments might
beso perverse as to systematically discriminate against
rural producers in this inevitably undesirable way.
Once he adds the assumption that groups invariably
seek to maximise their short term material advantages,
he is quickly led to the conclusion that this
'exploitation' of agriculture must be due to the fact
that African governments are dominated by people
whose narrow, short-term material interests are served
by such exploitative policies, and whose survival in
power must depend on their ability to use the resulting
surplus to buy off elements of the losing groups. The
people that best fit this description are variously
identified as the industrial capitalists and workers, the
bureaucracy or the 'urban dwellers'.
To these two basic determinants of govenment policy
Bates adds a third, but apparently without realising
the conflict this generates. Thus he also 'assumes
throughout that political action is purposeful
behaviour, and that among the major purposes of
governments are the pursuit of certain social
objectives'. Moreover, 'foremost among the social
objectives . . . is to shift the basis of their economies
away from the production of agricultural commodities
and toward the production of manufactured goods'
and this 'strongly influences their choice of
agricultural policies' (pp3/4).
Unfortunately, the rest of the discussion never
adequately explores the implications of this statement.
Had it done so, it would have discovered the real
difficulty of defining an optimal development strategy
and the inadequacy of his crude assumption that any
extraction of surplus from agriculture is contrary to
the general interest. Nevertheless, this is combined
with the equally crude assertion that those in the
'ruling coalition' are necessarily motivated by narrow,
short-term interests, to suggest a variety of hypotheses
regarding the likely degree and pattern of surplus
extraction from agriculture. Chief among these are the
following:
(i) Surplus extraction from agriculture will be
more severe in poorer societies because the political
importance of cheap food policies is relatively
greater.
Such extraction will be greater where rural
producers are less powerful, and they will be less
powerful where they are largely smallholders.
Surplus is easier to extract from export crops,\ts o 'ùe as'ter to control.
Surplus extraction is likely to be more intense
when the economy has no access to surplus from
other sources, such as minerals.
(y) When resources are channelled to the rural
areas, this is done via 'projects' or discretionary
subsidies which are favoured over higher producer
prices because both can be directed to specific
identifiable groups on a discretionary and
sufficiently 'visible' basis to buy political support.
These propositions are of considerable practical
interest, but their analytical significance is far less than
the author supposes since they exclude the possibility
that groups or individuals may take a longer or wider
view of their self-interest or that some surplus
extraction may be desirable and 'efficient', if certain
structural changes are to be achieved. His failure to
integrate these issues into the discussion is the more
surprising since he explicitly acknowledges them as
possibilities, although unfortunately only in passing.
Ultimately, the strength of the argument lies in its clear
recognition that any technically desirable policy is no
more than a hypothetical possibility, until it has
obtained the support of some politically plausible
coalition. While this represents an advance over
wholly economistic approaches, it is no advance over
the political economy debates which might be said to
take this as their basic point of departure. Indeed, in
relation to these, the argument appears rather
simplistic and the lucidity and apparent clarity of its
conclusions rests primarily on its exclusion of the most
awkward issues. Once these are re-introduced into the
discussion, they soon remind us ofthe reasons why the
conclusions of the political economy debate are
invariably less elegant, less unambiguous and
apparently less rigorous than those constructed in
Bates' spurious laboratory conditions, created in his
case, not by demagnetised vacuum chambers as in the
natural sciences, but by a heuristic, make-believe
world, protected against intrusions from the real
world by conveniently framed assumptions.
Unfortunately, the consequent clarity and rigour is
obtained at an exorbitant price.
This is not to denigrate Bates' attempt to encourage
development economists to acknowledge the
importance of the political dimension. Nor is it to
imply that the political economy debates have settled
these issues, making further efforts redundant. Far
from it. In fact, the problems raised by Bates'
approach to these problems imply the need to go
further, by integrating important, additional areas of
real uncertainty into the discussion, because only then
shall we come closer to understanding the real world.Uo\1, ' ¶\Ti se'wes tiurher
removed from the beauty and simplicity of Bates'
present conclusions.
Excluded and Neglected Problems:
Short versus Long-Term 'Efficiency'
Bates' argument is centrally based on the assertion
that 'efficiency' is adequately defined in terms of
responsiveness to the world market's price signals.
This is not a defensible position. Even the most ardent
neo-classical economist must accept that the fashioning
of an economy's future comparative advantage will
require investments in infrastructure, industry,
technology, education and many other areas, which
cannot be adequately determined by current prices;
whose 'pay off' will often be long deferred and
obtained in the form of benefits that are not project
specific and difficult to quantify; and which will be
subject to a relatively high degree of uncertainty.
This is no minor objection. The moment it is
recognised that systematic departures from current
price signals are usually required to achieve 'long term
efficiency', the complexity of the 'political problem'
increases, because the 'optimal deviation' from
market signals now becomes a matter for political
definition, under conditions of uncertainty. Further-
more, the 'real world' will not easily tolerate the
convenient fiction that the peasants' short term
interests can always be equated with the 'general
interest' or, to paraphrase Bates, with 'beneficial
consequences for the societies of which they are a
part'.
In Bates' own terms this quite simply means taking
more seriously his assertion that governments are
strongly influenced 'in their choice of agricultural
policies' by their 'social objective' of transforming the
economy by building a stronger non-agricultural
sector. As he recognises when discussing the
opportunities created by the presence of significant
quantities of mineral wealth, such an objective would
always require a shift of surplus between sectors. This
would, of course, include agriculture, so that surplus
extraction from agriculture is clearly not always
contrary to the interests of society, nor even to the long
term interests of the peasantry. This greatly
complicates the definition of the political coalitions
that would be required to avoid the implementation of
public 'policies that have harmful consequences for
the societies they govern'.
This point becomes particularly telling when it is
applied to agriculture itself. There is, in fact, little
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empirical evidence to show that total agricultural
output, as opposed to the output of particular crops, is
highly price elastic. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged
that significant price responses will only be
forthcoming if effective investment in infrastructure,
research, marketing and information diffusion has
preceded such price incentives.
Obviously, these arguments do not justify any degree
of surplus extraction from agriculture, since excessive
zeal on this front may induce marketed surpluses to
fall so far that the higher rates of extraction actually
yield lower total quantities of surplus, as in the so-
called 'scissors crisis' of the Soviet Union in the I 930s.
On the other hand, it does mean that any transfer of
surplus from agriculture cannot simply be denounced
as contrary to the 'social interest'. It also means that
African states cannot solve this problem simply by
adhering to world market prices in setting their
domestic prices, even though there are many cases in
Africa today where surplus extraction from agriculture
has been excessive and where prices should probably
be brought closer to those prevailing in the world
market.
Excluded and Neglected Problems: Policy
Risks in the Real World
Because Bates does not take the above issues seriously,
he is unable to address the question of the differential
risks associated with various policies or strategies.
Once again his world is a simple place where resources
are flexible and mobile and where different patterns of
specialisation do not carry varying degrees of risk.
Discrimination in favour of food crops is frowned
upon as a legacy of the bad old order. The
international market is treated as a 'given', whose
vagaries need not be critically examined before
African governments formulate agricultural policy.
The ironic result is that, having roundly denounced
the African elites for their stupidity in thinking that
peasants could, or would, bear the burdens imposed
by their hasty and ill-considered 'modernisation
programmes', Bates now suggests that one should rely
on those same peasants to 'do the job' of financing
growth and development (and, apparently, of paying
off accumulated debts), so long as they are given the
largest possible share of the relevant international
price. This in spite of the fact: that some of those prices
have recently fallen so sharply that the farmers would
now be getting less than they got five years ago, even if
they were now to receive 90 per cent of the world
market price; that the deterioration of infrastructure
(especially of roads) and of capital equipment
(especially lorries) has raised the actual costs of
marketing dramatically in the meantime; and that the
relative debt burden being carried by these economies
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has grown explosively and has to be carried in foreign
exchange, financed from primary exports.
Bates' inability to deal sensibly with the problem of
uncertainty, given his assumptions, is reflected most
clearly in his summary of Africa's dismal experience
with its development projects, when he writes:
To increase output, governments finance pro-
duction programs. But in doing so, they introduce
characteristic distortions. Given the level of
resources devoted to the programs, for example,
they often create too many projects; the programs
then fail because the resources have been spread
too thin. Such behaviour is nonsensical when
analyzed solely in terms of stated objectives. . . (p5).
Like all the others, this 'paradox' is resolved by being
shown to be the result of political calculations based
on the short-term interests of the immediate actors.
Yet, while these are clearly significant, this is a
nonsensical way of depicting the issue, because it
implies that these decisions were non-problematic,
factual decisions made by certain local groups in
accordance with their unambiguous, narrow self-
interest, rather than being decisions subject to high
risk or uncertainty. It cannot have escaped notice that
the point in the 1970s when the largest proportion of
Africa's development projects suddenly ceased to be
viable coincided with the onset of a severe global
recession and an unprecedented rise in energy prices,
followed by a steep increase in international interest
rates and a sharp decline in the prices of'most of
Africa's commodity exports. Surely this 'coincidence'
deserves some comment and thought, as regards the
risks borne by very poor economies integrating
themselves rapidly into a volatile international
economy, when they have little margin for error and
relatively little resource flexibility. Certainly it is
unrealistic to suggest that the relatively general failure
of Africa's development projects can simply be
presented as a result of obviously 'nonsensical'
decisions that can only be explained in terms of the
political interests they served, as if their actual
outcome had been intended and forseeable and as if
each project had not been ratified as 'viable' by
technical experts from abroad. In fact, both in the
future, as in the past, all such decisions will require
difficult judgements and will always be subject to high
levels of uncertainty. Moreover, if things are to change
significantly, they will have to be taken by political
coalitions prepared (or induced) to take a longer term
view of their 'consequences for the societies they
govern' (Bates) and to take full account of the
attendant risks from that perspective. This is the real
political task. It is far more complex than that
presented by Bates, and the latter's analysis and
conclusions do nothing to clarify the need for, or to
facilitate the accomplishment of that task. Indeed they
constitute an obstacle to both of these objectives.
Excluded and Neglected Problems:
The International Dimension
The last point already draws attention to the
devastating 'omission' of the international dimension
from Bates' argument. The rationale offered for it is
highly revealing and deserves to be cited at length.
Bates differentiates his contribution from that group
of political economists who 'share a common
conviction: that patterns of change in Third World
countries are largely determined by international
political and economic forces', by arguing that:
It is clear enough, of course, that major forces
affecting the prosperity of Africa have originated in
the developed nations; the depression of the 1930s
and the boom of the 1950s are the most vivid
examples. But it is less well understood that
African states strongly influence the specific ways
in which these forces affect them. They do so out of
regard for their own needs and the needs of
powerful interests within their own societies.
Furthermore, as I will show, the ways in which they
manipulate these forces create enduring patterns of
advantage within the emergent social order of
Africa. This study therefore joins the work of
others in arguing that to understand the patterns of
development in Third World nations, scholars
should pay more attention to the capacity for
autonomous choice on the part of local actors,
both public and private, and give greater weight to
the importance of these choices in shaping the
impact of external environments upon the
structure of local societies [Bates 1981:81.
As it stands this statement appears unobjectionable,
but Bates actually uses it to exclude the international
dimensions, as if those internal forces could be
analysed and understood separately from external
pressures; and as if the African state were an
autonomous, local institution dealing with, and being
influenced by, various external pressures. In spite of
this extraordinary procedure, he suggests that his
work shares the same basic approach as that of Alavi
and Saul, but this is surely based on a misunder-
standing. Certainly Alavi and Saul, and many others
writing in the political economy tradition, have
struggled to move beyond the crude external
determinism that has characterised some contri-
butions to this debate, but this has led them quite
properly to attempt an integration of those internal
and external forces. Nothing but confusion can be
sown by this attempt to analyse Africa's 'internal'
political forces in isolation.
In a seminar at IDS, Bates clarified his position on this
point. Asked why he had chosen to exclude external
influences on the domestic political scene, he answered
that he felt that he had had to choose between
emphasising the internal or the external dimension of
the problem, and that he had decided to choose the
internal because he did 'not like Africans being
presented merely as passive victims of international
forces'. This most unsatisfactory answer confirms that
Bates sees these as 'alternatives', to be chosen apriori
by the analyst. If that appears hardly credible, it is
nonetheless borne out by the discussion in this book.
Even his policy conclusions are drawn without explicit
consideration of these 'external factors' which, one
can only assume, are thought to have no bearing on
the kinds of policies that would be deemed to be in the
'general interest' or the kind of political coalitions that
might be needed to support them.
This omission is fundamental. There is no way that the
internal coalitions of Africa could be analysed without
considering the role of foreign investors, of aid
donors, of the international agencies and of the
pressures emanating from the real (as opposed to the
hypothetical) international market. These external
forces are not necessarily dominant, but they are
important and their influence increases as the African
economies become more acutely dependent on
external credit for survival. If they are excluded, the
resulting picture must be seriously distorted and
policy recommendations made on such a basis could
be sensible only by accident.
The effect of this omission, whether calculated or not,
is to eliminate the possibility that, far from being the
rational and efficient 'alternative' market forces might
actually be generating or reinforcing some of those
problematic 'political pressures'. This would destroy
the brilliant simplicity of the assertion that, 'if the
basic problem of farming in the developing countries
is improper incentives for farmers . . . then it follows
that the origins of the problem lie in the actions of
those who distort the operations of the market'.
Moreover, once it is accepted that 'policies that have
beneficial consequences for the societies they govern'
will often require some systematic and nationally
defined deviation from international market signals,
then the demand for 'static efficiency' that finds
expression through the firms, the individuals and the
agencies that use international price signals as their
reference point, would itself constitute a major
problem - the more so if the main actors in the
international market have the power to manipulate
prices, interest rates and exchange rates in their own
interests. Even if such external pressures are not
dominant, they unquestionably represent important,
systematic influences on Africa's politics and policies.
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Conclusions
Just how important these various excluded factors are
will vary over time and space. Certainly those
'internal' factors that are highlighted by Bates will
generally prove to be important, but in every case their
impact will be inextricably intertwined with these
other factors. In the final analysis, the greatest
challenge facing African societies is that of creating
stable political coalitions able to define and to sustain
policies that serve their 'general interest', in a difficult,
hostile and uncertain international environment. The
greatest failing of Bates' analysis is that it totally
obscures this central issue because it isolates internal
from external factors and assumes, in good
neoclassical fashion, that the world market serves
equally the global, the national and the individual
interest.
To summarise, it is suggested that Bates' general
argument is deeply flawed because it is based on
indefensible assumptions that exclude important
questions. As a consequence, the conclusions are both
inadequate and misleading. However, even if one
accepts the underlying premises of his argument, it
suffers from a number of serious problems in its
internal logic.
Bates has argued that efficiency and the social interest,
as defined by him, requires: that farmers should be
paid world market prices; that African farmers have
been paid less than this; and that this 'must be' due to
the fact that other interest groups have used their
power to serve their narrow sectional interests, at the
expense of the peasants and of society as a whole. He
then concludes, quite naturally, that it is essential to
'let farmers into the ruling coalition', if things are to
improve.
However, this poses a problem that is not adequately
resolved. Elsewhere Bates argues that the political
influence of farmers is generally greatly enhanced, if
there are some relatively wealthy, large farmers who
can command political attention because they wield
economic power. However, he acknowledges that
these wealthy farmers may themselves be members of
the anti-peasant or anti-agriculture coalition; equally,
in other cases, they may be the most effective
spokesmen in defence of genuine agricultural
interests. Unfortunately, little is said about the factors
that might determine this outcome. In fact, the
implication that 'farmers' do have some general
common interest is not adequately explored, given its
fundamental significance to the argument. In the
absence of that discussion, the conclusion that more
power should be given to 'farmers' cannot be
considered very helpful.
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This point would be reinforced ifit were acknowledged
that a united, undifferentiated body of 'farmers' may
demand 'more than their share' (i.e. subsidies) if they
held power, and that the resulting high prices might be
used to protect them against the need to seek enhanced
productivity through improved techniques of pro-
duction. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the
real implication of Bates' argument is not that power
should go to 'the peasants', but that it should go to
those whose interest lies in enforcing adherence to
world market prices. It merely so happens that in
many African countries, peasants presently have an
interest in pushing producer prices closer to world
market prices. However, analytically this is a mere
coincidence and no-one should be misled into thinking
that there is, therefore, a fundamental coincidence of
interests between the peasantry of Africa and
international finance. The fact that the two may be
pulling in the same direction on this issue at this
particular moment, is hardly an adequate basis for
such a conclusion.
A second problem is revealed when Bates extols the
virtues of mineral revenues as a source of investible
surplus and suggests that this would ease the pressure
on agriculture. His argument takes little account of the
previous discussion of agriculture - how 'rents could
be extracted from mining' hardly considers the
question of the 'political coalition' that would be
needed for that to be possible; nor does it consider the
possibility that a 'scissors crisis' could also occur in the
mining sector, in that if its margins were squeezed too
hard, production might well fall more than
proportionately. In fact Bates never explains why
surplus extraction from this sector is treated as quite
naturally beneficial. Given the rest of the discussion,
this cannot be taken for granted. Moreover there is no
reason to believe that a purely self-seeking elite would
not simply add what surplus they could squeeze from
agriculture to that which they could get from mining.
Indeed, the trade-off that Bates assumes only arises if
the surplus that is being extracted is intended for some
limited purpose, such as the desire for structural
change. Only then does it make sense to argue that if
the surplus thus required can be obtained from
minerals, then the pressure on agriculture would
cease.
Finally, as indicated at the outset, right at the end of
the book Bates makes the extraordinary statement
that: 'Alternatively, in response to the erosion of
advantages engendered by shortfalls in production,
the dominant interests may be persuaded to forsake
the pursuit of unilateral short-run advantage, and
instead to employ strategies that evoke cooperation by
sharing joint gains'.
The reader is somewhat unprepared for this blow,
which acts like a sudden self-destruct mechanism built
into the last page of the text. The statement takes one
right back to square one, undermining the entire
argument that has gone before since, if that choice is
always open to people - and to bureaucrats - and
their behaviour is not governed by some self-evident,
narrow self-interest, then choices become far more
complex and uncertain and the problem of politics
arises in a more realistic manner. In a manner,
moreover, that would require a rather different type of
analysis and that would undoubtedly suggest rather
different conclusions.
Most significantly perhaps, Bates' recognition of the
importance of 'joint gains' based on 'cooperation'
necessarily implies the existence of some national
rationality that must be counterposed to that of the
global market. This clearly denies the validity of his
use of international prices as adequate arbiters of
efficiency, or his exclusion of the international
dimension from the analysis of domestic political
coalitions. Indeed, it confirms that the central political
problem confronting Africa - and the rest of the
developing world - is that of constituting a political
coalition able to purse a national strategy capable of
producing such 'joint gains', and of protecting that
national rationality against the global rationality of
international capital. In order to analyse that
problem, one needs to start from this paragraph at the
end of Bates' book; and one needs to work with
different assumptions, different definitions and
different concepts.
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